A. Syrigos: The worst possible timing for closing the Cyprus issue

by Alexandra Ktisti

Angelos M. Syrigos, associate professor of International Law & Foreign Policy at Panteion University in Athens, Greece, assesses everything that has occurred in the recent months concerning the Cyprus issue, he evaluates and explains the negotiations’ developments, the plan and the proposals that are on the table, what is at stake, what is the role of Greece, what the Turkey’s intentions are, as well as  its incentives and possible next steps.

Which is going to be the next phase of the negotiations after the disaster in Mont Pelerin of Switzerland? Which are the provisions about the ongoing dialogue, is there any room for manoeuvre?

In the beginning of the forthcoming January a summit will take place in Switzerland comprised of two phases. In the first phase only Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are going to participate, without serious possibility to reach a specific agreement regarding the territorial issue, which is the most crucial point. In the second phase will participate also the three guarantor powers, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and whoever may be interested in.

It is evident that during the second phase, we are heading for an all-inclusive negotiating procedure. That prospect is not beneficial for the Greek part, as same occurs also for the extortionate timelines. It is always preferable to assess each step before moving to the next one. 

What kind of role Greece aspires to play as a guarantor power? Multilateral or quintet summit? Which option is more profitable for Greece and what do you consider about the solution that they are going to reach?

Greece correctly regards that the function of the guarantees from a state to another is obsolete according to the international law. Therefore, Greece desires to stop that situation. On the contrary, Turkey still perceives its role as a guarantor power. Moreover, it has intentions to legitimize the use of force in the frame of the guarantees in order to continue intervening in the future.

Greece does not like a quintet summit because that would equate the Republic of Cyprus with the pseudo-state. Usually, the UN invents a formula and might call the quintet summit as “multilateral” so that everyone is satisfied.

Concerning the solution, there are four points that we should take into account. The first is what we are doing now in the negotiations. Which are the points that we are interested in and which tactic are we following during the negotiating procedure? The second point is what we should do in the case that negotiations fail. What is the plan B? Third point is what we are doing if the negotiations resolution will be rejected by the Greek Cypriots, which is a very possible scenario under the current circumstances. Finally, the fourth point concerns generally how we are dealing with Turkey. At this point I believe that Turkey under certain conditions might attempt to incorporate the occupied territories. 

I am afraid that Greece and the Republic of Cyprus jointly, they do not have an answer to those strategic questions. We agree just about the tactic during the negotiations, which means that everything depends on the next meeting. If the Turkish Cypriots will not keep their word, as it happened in the end of November in Mont Pelerin, we do not know how to manage that situation. 

On the occasion of the negotiations reopening in Mont Pelerin, our mind inevitably threw back 10-15 years in the past to the Annan Plan for Cyprus. Which were the structural weaknesses of the Annan Plan and why does it still remains as roadmap for the current negotiations?

The plan that is under discussion is similar to the Annan Plan, indeed. There will be two states, one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot. At central level, it will be a federal government and two representative bodies, the Lower House and the Senate and the members’ participation will be pre-defined based on their originating, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. We are talking about a bureaucratic and finally non-functional system. 

Rejection of the Annan Plan in 2004 was the result of some of its provisions: The Turkish troops would abandon the island after 14 years. At least 100.000 settlers would remain permanently on the island. The provisions about the restoration of property to its legitimate owners were so convoluted and complicated that could be lost in bureaucracy. Also, the territories that would be refunded to the Greek Cypriot part would be reimbursed after three years and a half, inadmissibly long period. At the same time, the Greek Cypriots would hand over their strong hand, the official identity of the Republic of Cyprus, from the first day of the new state’s creation.

I do not think that the situation is going to change radically now.

Let us examine the factor of time. The UN, the USA and the EU are pushing for the continuity of the dialogue till the solution, the Turkish and the Turkish Cypriot sides are showed in the media determined to reach an agreement and Cyprus is just blaming the opposite side for the deadlock. How that pressure could affect the outcome of the negotiations? Should the Cyprus issue close at the current timing? 

I am afraid that it is the worst possible timing for closing the Cyprus issue. Turkey is under severe pressure at its Eastern borders. It is pushing for a broadest swapping of territory and power in its neighborhood. It is placing many of its claims on the table, led by an arrogant leadership.

I do not know if the timing would be proper after one or two years. A requirement would be to discover more rich sources in the underground of the EEZ of Cyprus that would help the Greek Cypriot side to change the power correlation. In general, however, I fully concur with the view of Petros Molyviatis concerning the Annan Plan in 2004. “There are no last chances in Diplomacy” he noted.

The closing of Cyprus issue is not an end in itself. A bad solution will cause more serious problems in the future.

Which country cares more for the closing of the Cyprus issue, Greece or Cyprus? And why do they worry so much about that issue?

Obviously, Greek Cypriots attach greater importance on the issue, because let us not forget that one-third of them, i.e. 200.000 people are refugees after the Turkish invasion in 1974. But as a topic, I think it concerns the position of Hellenism in total. If there were no Greeks in Cyprus, Turkey’s interest would be comparatively limited. The presence of Greeks to its underbelly is the matter that makes Turkey be worried.

How would you explain Turkey’s pressure on Greece and EU? What Erdogan has on his mind?

Erdogan is possessed by expansionist ideas and that’s reflected on the three grandiose milestones he has set for Turkey with reference to specific symbolic dates.

The first plan is the 2023 plan which is linked to the 100th anniversary of the Turkish state’s establishment. According to that plan, Turkey aspires to be one of the 10 more powerful economies in the world. In the field of foreign policy, Turkey desires to be a global geostrategic player and a regional superpower. The second plan of 2053 has as a benchmark the 600 years after the Fall of Constantinople. At that time Turkey projects to be included in the 5 more powerful economies globally and also be a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The third plan, set for 2071, implies the 1000 years after the Battle of Manzikert and the Turkish invasion in Asia Minor. There are no specific objectives defined at that point, but it concerns the heritage of the Seljuks. The unspoken point of the Seljuks’ heritage for the Islamists is the fact that they expanded to non Muslim territories  defeating the most important Christian power of that times…

Those three plans reminds me a comment expressed by an American diplomat about the Neo-Ottomanism: Rolls Royce ambitions but with a Rover engine. In that framework we should consider also the pressure that Erdogan is trying to bring to Greece and Europe.