by Judy Dempsey*
They worked well after 1945, when so many countries were trying to recover from the destruction wreaked by World War II.
The United States took the lead in establishing a plethora of institutions, from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and creating formats such as the G7 or Group of Industrial Countries, which was later expanded to the G20, which included non-Western countries. And don’t forget NATO, through which the United States provided Europe with security guarantees, and the European Coal and Steel Community, the precursor to today’s European Union.
These American-led institutions were designed to foster stability, economic growth, and cooperation. They were also part of the Cold War structures at a time when the world was ideologically divided between the democratic West, led by the United States, and a totalitarian system dominated by the then-Soviet Union. Both blocs vied for influence, whether in Africa, Asia, or Latin America.
Fast forward to 2023, over thirty years since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. These institutions are now under immense pressure. The issues have become complex, abetted by globalization. Climate change and pandemics are affecting migration, food security, the way societies have to adapt their lifestyles. And there are wars, conflicts, corruption, and new, emerging alliances that fundamentally challenge the status quo of the post–1945 institutions.
The recent G20 summit, hosted by India, reflects these shifts. It should have been the chance for these countries to unite in trying to tackle the many challenges. Yes, the thirty pages of the joint declaration mentioned all the relevant topics that affect most countries, from climate change and demands of digitization, to the need to ward off protectionism.
But when it came to Russia’s war against Ukraine, the G20 ducked the issue—even though the repercussions of the war have global implications.
After hours of haggling over the declaration to obtain consensus, leaders opted for a very low common denominator: “We highlighted the human suffering and negative added impacts of the war in Ukraine with regard to global food and energy security, supply chains, macro-financial stability, inflation and growth, which has complicated the policy environment for countries.”
The fact that this was Russia’s war and its brutal attempts to destroy Ukraine’s sovereignty were not mentioned. Instead, this is what the declaration stated: “We call on all states to uphold the principles of international law including territorial integrity and sovereignty, international humanitarian law, and the multilateral system that safeguards peace and stability.”
With so many other conflicts and catastrophes taking place—the earthquake in Morocco, the attack on a market in Khartoum, Sudan, the torrential rains in Libya—one can question all the attention paid by the EU, the United States, and Canada to Ukraine and Kyiv’s disappointment about the outcome of the G20 summit. Yet the reality is that Russia’s attack on Ukraine is shaping a new world order. The G20 summit, which was not attended by Russian or Chinese leaders, confirms these trends.
For example, India’s President Narendra Modi continued his country’s careful balancing act between the United States, Russia, and China—although New Delhi is slowly shifting some of its foreign policy stances toward the Joe Biden administration. Yet, as Amaia Sanchez-Cacicedo from the EU Institute for Security Studies argues: India has its very particular interests to juggle.
“Since taking over the G20 chair in December 2022, New Delhi has sought to use the G20 forum to pressure Russia to stop the war, as well as to counterbalance China,” writes Sanchez-Cacicedo. “The caveat lies in the fact that while New Delhi sees Moscow as a useful pole to counterbalance China’s leverage, Russia sees India and China as counterweights to US hegemony.” And New Delhi is more than worried about the growing relationship between Beijing and Moscow.
As for Brazil, President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who has close ties with Moscow, said he had no qualms in inviting President Vladimir Putin to the next G20 summit, which Lula himself will host. Forget about the fact that Brazil is a signatory to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court—the court that issued an arrest warrant for Putin in March 2023.
“I believe that Putin can go easily to Brazil,” Lula said on the sidelines of the G20 summit. “What I can say to you is that if I’m president of Brazil, and he comes to Brazil, there’s no way he will be arrested,” he added.
Not long after the summit, North Korean dictator-president, Kim Jong Un, was on his way—in an armored train—to Russia’s eastern part of Vladivostok. There, he will attend an economic forum hosted by Putin. More importantly, he will discuss arms deliveries to Russia, which the latter needs against Ukraine. That could make Moscow indebted to Pyongyang. And what would such a relationship do for reviving non-proliferation or disarmament talks?
Countries in the Middle East are also denting the status quo of the multilateral institutions and America’s weakening role in the region. A detente is emerging between Saudi Arabia and Iran, while Iran is supplying weapons to Russia.
Elsewhere, China and Russia are active in many countries in Africa while France’s traditional presence and influence in the region, particularly in the Sahel, is waning. The players and trading patterns are changing. As The Economist reported, “the IMF reckons that 26% of Middle Eastern goods exports go to China and India, almost double the level in 2000 and roughly twice the share headed for America and Europe. Recently, this geopolitical realignment has led to a desire to de-escalate conflicts.”
The war in Ukraine is not the catalyst in pushing these shifts—it is a symptom of them. The longer the war continues and the longer military support for Kyiv is incremental and not decisive for a victory, the more multilateral institutions—anxious to maintain unity—will opt for the lowest common denominator. Such trends diminish their influence, and that of the West.
*nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Europe and editor in chief of Strategic Europe
**first published in: Carnegieeurope.eu
By: N. Peter Kramer
