by Dimitar Bechev and Iliriana Gjoni
Unnoticed by many, EU enlargement is moving forward at a steady pace. The European Commission is edging closer to wrapping up membership talks with Montenegro, and the council may soon set up a working group on drafting an accession treaty. Albania, the other frontrunner, is hoping to be in the EU by 2030, too. The commission may soon issue a positive assessment report on rule of law reforms, opening the final stage of negotiations with Tirana.
But what seems to be good news today might turn into a major headache for European policymakers tomorrow. It is only a matter of time before far-right populists in France, Germany, or the Netherlands wake up to the EU’s imminent expansion. Once they do, they will likely stoke fears of migration to boost their already substantial electoral numbers. Of the two frontrunners, Albania is particularly exposed, given its chronic problems with corruption and organised crime. But Montenegro, a much smaller country that is home to just 600,000 citizens, is not immune to bad press either. Securing ratification won’t be smooth sailing. In France, for example, there is a constitutional clause requiring either a three-fifths majority in both chambers of the legislature or a referendum, as a hold-over from efforts to keep Turkey out.
What Montenegro and Albania, along with the rest of the Western Balkans, need is to make a positive case for their membership. Geopolitical arguments—if it is not Brussels, Russia and China will be taking over—won’t do the trick. Rather, candidate countries should emphasize their tangible contribution to European security and welfare. They should style themselves as a net asset for the union, not a burden. And this messaging should not only be geared toward Brussels but also key member states.
First, on defense, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Albania are already members of NATO. They contribute troops to allied battlegroups stationed in Latvia and Bulgaria, participate in joint exercises, and have sent equipment to Ukraine. They also take part in peacekeeping missions in Kosovo and Bosnia, led by NATO and the EU respectively, as well as in Common Security and Defence Policy actions around the world. Though their armed forces are small, these countries can further ramp up these deployments, freeing up EU countries to increase their efforts on the Eastern flank and in Ukraine.
Candidate countries can and should be involved in Europe’s ongoing rearmament and force-modernization drive. These three NATO members have committed to scale up core defense spending from around 2 percent to 3.5 percent of their GDP, a target they could reach by the mid-2030s. They have signed security partnerships with the EU, paving the way for participation in union-wide schemes such as the European defense industry program. The Western Balkans has legacy industries—plants in Bosnia and Serbia have supplied large volumes of artillery shells to Ukraine. But the requisite modernization calls for investment in bespoke capabilities and dual-use infrastructure. The region would also bolster European security by sheer virtue of their geographic location: Road and rail corridors linking the Adriatic to the Black Sea should be treated as a top priority for moving troops and materiel to the Eastern flank.
Beyond this, the Western Balkans should, second, emphasize their importance to the green transition. Albania and Montenegro are leaders in decarbonization, and the former is one of the few countries in the world where nearly 100 percent of energy comes from a renewable source—hydropower. Renewables dominate the Montenegrin system too, with hydropower accounting for 48 percent of capacity, wind accounting for 9 percent, and solar for 2 percent. Montenegro is the only candidate country that operates a national emissions trading scheme in line with the EU acquis. But that doesn’t mean the rest of the region is lagging behind—far from it. Between 2024 and 2025, Serbia saw an 11 percent increase in its renewable capacity, reaching four gigawatts—a share of its energy supply equal to coal.
The rapid growth of green energy strengthens resilience but also opens possibilities for economic growth and innovation. The hospitality business, historically hampered by blackouts in the peak summer period, depends on cheap and reliable energy. Manufacturing—including defense contractors—will profit too. But the ultimate prize is the IT sector, notably electricity-hungry data centers, which are key to advancements in artificial intelligence. A number of governments are keen to help, including by digitizing public services, improving connectivity, and offering incentives to foreign investors. Lower land and labor costs coupled with EU integration—including the adoption of the relevant digital legislation—are part of the Western Balkans’s attraction. All in all, the region could offer an alternative to EU-based data hubs, boosting productivity and innovation across the continent.
Finally, and to make the most of these opportunities, Balkan governments should double down on efforts to join the single market. They should focus on institutional reform and cross-border connectivity. It is a cliché that small, fragmented national markets are not competitive or attractive to strategic investors. There are formidable hurdles going forward, from state capture, to the underdeveloped financial sector, to the shortage of qualified labor due to decades of brain drain.
But that is no obstacle for the Western Balkans framing their accession to the EU in terms of competitiveness, an agenda the union has been prioritizing since the publication of the Draghi report in 2024. The clearer their contribution to Europe’s resilience and growth, the harder it is to justify keeping the frontrunners waiting.
There is a positive scenario in which Montenegro and Albania join in a package with Iceland, whose membership enjoys broad support. But they could just as easily see their prospects as tied to the far more politically difficult accessions of Ukraine and Moldova, which understandably dominate the debate. That is why they cannot remain passive applicants. To meet the 2030 target, they must make the case—across Brussels and key member states—that their accession strengthens Europe’s security, competitiveness, and cohesion.
*Published first on Carnegie - Strategic Europe
By: N. Peter Kramer
