by Oana Popescu-Zamfir*
Romania’s presidential election demonstrates what happens when long-festering democratic dysfunction is met by determined foreign manipulation. It’s not a sudden rupture, but the solidifying of trends that have matured below the surface for years. Given the radical drift all around Europe, the country’s experience may offer a glimpse into the political future of other democracies.
The protest vote that has propelled the far-right president of the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR), George Simion and independent, liberal Bucharest Mayor Nicușor Dan into the final round is the predictable product of a political class that, over decades, hollowed out its own credibility.
Party leaders prioritized loyalty and corruption over competence, opportunism over policy and values, sidelined internal meritocracy, and turned representative democracy into a performance without substance.
This created deep disenfranchisement and resignation within the general population that was ripe for Russia to exploit. Now, the bill for that broken social contract is coming due with the results on full display in the current election outcome.
That is why Simion, a candidate once considered fringe, now finds himself on the verge of victory. He declared that he was acting as replacement to the disqualified pro-Russian candidate Călin Georgescu, who accompanied him to the vote last Sunday. Romania is now dangerously close to joining the ranks of Europe’s populist nationalist axis led by Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. If Simion wins, the EU’s unity on Ukraine and pushback against Russia, as well as its ability to face U.S. President Donald Trump’s trade war, will be further endangered.
This election is a cautionary tale for European mainstream parties who keep appeasing extremists, thinking they are co-opting them.
If Simion wins, it won’t be because he stormed the gates. It will be because the gatekeepers let him in—quietly, even eagerly. In fact, he is no outsider. The establishment nurtured him and his ideology of reunification with the Republic of Moldova. The nationalist-sovereignist rhetoric was long cultivated by Romanian politicians, whose willing cooperation was used by Russia to achieve deep societal transformation over years of interference.
Anti-Western narratives and mistrust of democracy catered both to Moscow’s interest to regain regional influence and to the appetite of the political elites to retain unchecked power and privilege. Now, part of the political and institutional establishment may choose to support Simion in the second round because, for all his rhetoric, he wants to be part of the ruling class and plays by their rules when needed, as opposed to the unpredictability of the truly independent Nicușor Dan.
Despite mainstream parties drifting into irrelevance, as the electorate has sharply rejected the candidate of the governing coalition, the political class is already trying to avoid any sweeping reform. The Liberals’ only chance for survival is to leave government, support runner-up Nicușor Dan and, if he loses, go into opposition and build a healthy democratic alternative together with the Save Romania Union—founded by Dan years ago.
All parties, in fact, have strong reasons to let others govern and avoid facing responsibility for implementing painful economic measures to bring down the largest budget deficit in an EU member state. If the Social-Democrats come back as part of the next government, after their prime minister, Marcel Ciolacu, resigned immediately after the election, it will not be to fix what they have broken, but to keep control over money and institutions. They may quietly support Simion and co-opt his party, AUR, into government, profiling themselves as the senior, responsible, and competent partner.
In this election, Russian influence was amplified by pressure from elements of the Trump-aligned MAGA movement to create a window of opportunity for a radical reversal of the country’s democratic course and strategic orientation. Simion’s success will no doubt embolden them. Russian influence has already become normalized, and has continued more visibly and explicitly after the annulled presidential election last year.
If Simion wins, Romania may shift into a hybrid model—akin to Slovakia under Prime Minister Robert Fico: populist-nationalist, transactional in foreign policy, and erratic in governance. EU funds could be frozen. Investors may flee. Credit ratings may fall—because this shift may reflect a deep, structural pivot in Romania’s democratic culture.
And in foreign policy, expect a cooling of relations with Ukraine and Moldova, both of which have declared Simion persona non grata for actions against their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Bucharest may also reduce its support for Ukraine and favor Trump’s idea of a quick peace at any cost to Kyiv. The temptation to align with MAGA and weaken EU cohesion will be real, and future engagement with Russia or China may no longer be taboo.
Nevertheless, full-scale autocratic collapse remains unlikely. Romanians are still overwhelmingly pro-EU and pro-NATO. A total exit isn’t on the cards. Yet, a quieter erosion—cooperation with revisionist powers, soft-pedaling sanctions, and diplomatic ambivalence—could be just as damaging. Romania’s full economic integration with the EU and dependence on Brussels funds and foreign direct investment might function as a deterrent of radical measures such as nationalism and protectionism, because it would hurt the populist constituency first. Both Simion and the Social-Democrats, especially if they co-opt AUR into government, may seek to build international credibility and hence refrain from crossing too many red lines.
Certainly, if Nicușor Dan wins the presidency against all odds, through mobilization to stop extremism, the country would have dodged a bullet—for now. To restore sound democratic competition, political parties need to become representative of their electorate again. People might complain about politics and say that they’re sick and tired of it, but it is precisely politics, the exercise of leadership, delegation of power, representation and engagement with the voters that can fix the broken connection between leaders and society.
To that end, a fair information environment, where freedom of speech stops short of manipulation, is a prerequisite to the return to the essence of democracy, which trusts people to make responsible decisions, rather than just provide an outlet for outbursts of anger and fervor for demagogues. The newly created EU Democracy Shield ought to be built around the mission to protect this very essence of democracy.
Oana Popescu-Zamfir
*Director, GlobalFocus Center
**first published in carnegieendowment.org
By: N. Peter Kramer
