by Vassilios Thierry Faïtas & Antonios Georgios Zairis*
Greece is considered one of Southern Europe’s most consequential maritime economic bridges, connecting the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, the Black Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean, and linking three continental ecosystems together—Europe, Asia, and Africa.
Its most significant ports are located in Piraeus and Thessaloniki—responsible for facilitating trade passage from mainland Europe—especially the Balkans—out to the rest of the world.
In turn, this makes Greece a key hub for European capital in Southern Europe, with partners such as France, Germany and Italy contributing to its economic and strategic development.
France accounts for around €2 billion of investments on Greek soil, with 150 French companies invested in fields such as transportation and energy (e.g., Thales), industry (e.g., Servier), and consumer goods (e.g., L’Oréal), alongside critical contracts focused on the Athens Stock Exchange, the East to Med Corridor and Mistral AI. France is also "investing" in a strategic relationship with Greece, having signed a bilateral defence agreement in 2021 and sold 24 Rafale aircraft and 3 Belharra frigates in order to consolidate security in the Eastern Mediterranean against territorial disputes and leverage Greece’s geostrategic position.
Germany is considered one of Greece’s largest investors with over €7.7 billion in investments, holding key assets in telecommunications with Deutsche Telekom in OTE, 14 regional airports managed by Fraport Greece and energy initiatives with Siemens and RWE.
Italy is also an important investor focused on Greek infrastructure and energy networks, notably through Italgas, which acquired DEPA Infrastructure (Enaon), Snam with its stake in the gas transmission operator DESFA and Ferrovie dello Stato Italiane, which operates Hellenic Train.
For Greece, these investments are essential, as they strengthen its economic stability, but also enrich the European economic ecosystem.
Yet, investments coming from third-party states, such as China, create challenges for the balance of such an ecosystem.
Chinese investments in Greece date back to the earliest periods of the economic crisis, when China invested €6 billion in Greek debt, reaching today an estimated total investment between €5 and €10 billion. Besides, Chinese capital was particularly consequential in Greece, especially during the debt crisis, helping the country attain vital liquidity and infrastructural modernisation. However, its latest expansion into the Greek market in recent years has also raised concerns among European partners.
Still, Chinese investments should not be thought of as homogeneous, as different entities have different interests and distinct priorities. As a state, Beijing is not always seeking to undermine European interests. Most of the time, it simply wants to expand its trade opportunities—which can offer reciprocal benefits even for European partners.
For China, Greece offered an ideal stepping stone into Southern Europe to put that trade strategy into practice. Notably, by acquiring a majority stake in the port of Piraeus via COSCO, China has marked its place in the European trade network and has shown a desire to further integrate into it.
Already in possession of the Port of Piraeus—a major node in the Southern European network— Beijing can exert influence across associated commercial activities through strategic transport corridors linking maritime terminals, warehouses, railways, distribution centres, and industrial markets in the Southern Mediterranean.
This risk becomes apparent when considering the fact that Chinese investments no longer limit themselves to maritime infrastructure, but also expand to the non-maritime market through smaller, but strategic investments. For example, Beijing introduces substantial and non-conditioned capital into Greek infrastructure projects through the Belt and Road Initiative, ultimately having a considerable impact on the TEN-T (Trans-European Transport Network)—with potential negative effects—and gaining increasing influence over regional trade flow decisions. Beyond commercial activity, Beijing’s inclusion into the European ecosystem may raise concerns about the appropriation of sensitive data and civilian infrastructure for national benefits that undermine European interests.
Beijing’s strategy extends beyond government capital—promoting private investors to expand in European markets. Chinese companies operate under the Guanxi system (personal relationship networks), with a binding mutual obligation to return a favour when asked. Most of the Chinese corporate world, being heavily influenced by the Chinese Communist Party, pursues its Military-Civil Fusion framework (Junmin Ronghe), where some Chinese companies investing in Greece act not as mere independent market actors, but as entities either trying to honour debt obligations or meet Beijing’s strategic imperatives.
Furthermore, an expanding number of Chinese enterprises are trained by the CICI (China Institute of Competitive Intelligence), a state institute, in the art of competitive intelligence in service of national priorities, utilising European market data to their advantage to become ever more competitive—sometimes hurting European competition.
Nevertheless, if these investments are not more efficiently controlled, Europe may become more vulnerable and dependent on Chinese trade. For example, Europe—including Greece—is becoming increasingly dependent on China, posting a record trade deficit of €359.9 billion in 2025 and finding itself critically dependent on imported raw materials.
Efforts have been made to counterbalance Chinese dependency, such as the Metlen-led gallium extraction project in northern Greece; however, an isolated case is not sufficient to relieve Europe from its dependencies.
These growing concerns have pushed European leaders to enforce stricter screening controls, aiming to balance out these investments and keep the European market stable.
Currently, the foreign investment screening system in the European Union displays weaknesses, clearing the vast majority of investments (92%) very quickly in Phase 1 (preliminary assessment) and reserving very few files for the in-depth investigation phase (8%), which is reserved for transactions presenting a real threat to security.
Greece, for its part, has shown resilience by adopting Law 5202 in 2025, which manages foreign investments through the interministerial committee DEEAXE (Interministerial Committee for Control of Foreign Direct Investments). This committee requires prior authorisation for investments exceeding 10% to 25%, depending on the sensitivity of the sector, under penalty of fines and nullity. In doing so, it obliges foreign investors to submit to Directorate B1 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a complete record of their shareholding history and ultimate beneficial owners (UBO).
Regulation (EU) 2026/1386, applicable from January 2028, plans to address this gap by requiring all Member States to participate in investment screening in sensitive sectors such as defence, financial services, and semiconductors. This comes with a substantial improvement to the cooperation mechanism, the harmonisation of procedures and the setting of stricter conditions on foreign investments such as those from China. Yet, China could still benefit from this delay.
While preparing itself for the implementation of this new regulation, Greece should strategically strengthen its resilience to Chinese investments by further increasing its cooperation with its most important European investors.
Chinese investments do not need to be halted completely—as some remain essential for the prosperity of the European economic ecosystem. The objective is therefore de-risking rather than decoupling, ensuring that capital inflows are monitored more efficiently through targeted screening regulations.
At the state level, Athens should pursue closer collaboration among Bercy (France), the BMWK (Germany), the Golden Power coordination office (Italy) and the Greek B1 Directorate, through the development of an economic and strategic intelligence system that both protects critical state data and simultaneously stays informed and adapts to emerging non-market techniques.
As for the protection of European companies on Greek soil, these screening authorities should introduce complementary security clauses such as integrity audits (verifying the identity and UBO of the investor), screening suspensive clauses (conditioning the final conclusion of the transaction on prior FDI clearance) and exit clauses in the event of an indirect hostile takeover.
With Greece at the centre of Chinese commercial expansion in Europe and state-backed economic competition becoming increasingly visible across the continent, the European Union—especially Greece—must quickly adopt a strategic plan focused on security and competitive intelligence,
including the Paris–Berlin–Rome axis, in order to guarantee shared economic sovereignty and ensure the resilience of a European strategic corridor in Southern Europe.
*Vassilios Thierry Faïtas is a Master’s student in International Strategies and Diplomacy at ISIT - Paris-Panthéon-Assas University.
*Antonios Zairis is a Prof. of Business Administration & Marketing and Member of the American Economic Association (AEA)
By: N. Peter Kramer
