The Political Outlook For Turkey In 2005

As expected, the E.U. summit in Brussels agreed on Dec. 17 to give a date for the beginning of accession negotiations with Turkey: Oct. 3, 2005.

While Ankara had hoped that the talks would start as early as April, the date was certainly within its range of the acceptable. A last minute hitch to the bargaining process came on the Cyprus issue, with the E.U. initially insisting that Ankara sign a document conferring formal recognition.

In the end, a compromise was struck whereby Turkey agreed to accept a protocol to its 1963 Association Agreement with the E.U., extending its Customs Union to the ten newest members of the E.U., which includes the exclusively Greek government of Cyprus, prior to the negotiation date.

The outcome of the Brussels summit is likely to have a number of important impacts on Turkish politics. It will strengthen Turkey's political orientation towards Europe, marginalizing, at least for the moment, those in Turkey who reject the E.U. relationship or insist that the Europeans are not sincere in offering full membership. The formal opening of talks, which is likely to proceed on time, will be the occasion for a domestic celebration of Turkey's European identity and the values inculcated by the country's founding father, Kemal Ataturk.

Ankara's breakthrough in relations with the E.U. will have wider foreign policy ramifications. The approach to accession negotiations will require considerable investment of political will and bureaucratic capacity. It is likely that there will be an administrative reorganization in the new year, with the creation of a super ministry charged with leading and coordinating negotiations with Brussels. The political team to the talks may also co-opt respected national personalities, such as former economy minister Kemal Dervis, even though they may not be members of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), in order to maximize Turkey's tactical bargaining, while also weakening the party's domestic opposition.

Despite enhanced orientation towards the E.U., the AKP, with its Islamist roots, is unlikely to want to return to the old Kemalist foreign policy of ignoring the world beyond the West. Moderate reformists in the party, such as Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, will want to use the growing convergence with the E.U. to increase Turkey's gravitational pull within the Islamic world.

In spite of criticism from the Right, it should prove possible for Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to sell his Cyprus concession domestically. It is therefore improbable that the issue of the recognition of Cyprus will block the beginning of accession negotiations, especially as they are scheduled for the U.K. presidency, which will be generally well disposed towards Turkey. However, neither is it likely that there will be a breakthrough in Cyprus peace negotiations during the next ten months, thereby helping to maintain the potential combustibility of the issue in E.U.-Turkish relations.

Erdogan has been able to claim a significant political victory. The majority of the Turkish press greeted the outcome positively and had nothing but praise for him and Gul. Erdogan must now decide how to extract maximum political capital.

His options are to call a snap general election, say for November, after the ceremonial beginning of the talks, but before the two sides hit any substantive difficulties. Such timing would come three years into the five-year parliamentary term, and must therefore be considered attractive, in spite of the fact that, in view of its current standing, it is difficult to imagine Erdogan's AKP emerging with a stronger position in parliament. Or he could use the outcome to strengthen his personal position within the party and the country at large.

The latter may be done with the spring 2007 presidential election (limited to parliamentary deputies) in mind, with Erdogan virtually a certainty if he chooses to run. If he is elected head of state in 2007, there will be an increased chance that Turkey will exchange its primarily parliamentary system for an executive presidency.

Erdogan also could exploit the outcome to remake Turkish party politics by seizing the middle ground and jettisoning the hard-line nationalist and Islamist elements in the party, who are instinctively suspicious of a converging relationship with Brussels.

Ankara will view the national elections on Jan. 30 with mixed feelings: relief that the transitional arrangements are now taking place; concern that Sunni Arab representation will not be comprehensive. Moreover, together with other regional states, Turkey will closely scrutinize the electoral outcome in order to gauge the strength of both theocratic elements within the Shia community and the more federalist-inclined character of Kurdish representation.

After the elections, attention will switch to the constitutional drafting process, in which Turkey has a strong interest. Ankara will exert its influence behind the scenes, especially in mitigating the more extreme federal model favored by Iraq's Kurds. In galvanizing this influence, Turkey will continue to work with the other main regional states, which hold periodic meetings on the future of Iraq.

However, it is far from likely that it would intervene militarily in the event of a more federalist blueprint being adopted. Turkey will be constrained both by its emerging E.U. relationship and the fact that it has no military presence in northern Iraq. It is, in any case, far from clear that the issue of the constitution will be resolved by the end of 2005.

Perhaps the area of greatest uncertainty is the impact of the Iraq imbroglio on Turkish-U.S. relations. Bilateral relations have recently been strained over the issue. Islamist activists have been shrill in their condemnation, for example over the Fallujah "genocide." There have been spontaneous anti-U.S. expressions among parts of the Turkish public. Whether out of conviction or populist opportunism, Erdogan has jumped on the bandwagon, snubbing the U.S. ambassador in Ankara.

While state-to-state relations are sound, and should remain so, further cases of gesture politics are possible, especially if the transitional political process in Iraq goes badly under U.S. leadership. Furthermore, the emerging relationship with the E.U. could embolden the Erdogan government into greater demonstrations of dissatisfaction with Washington, with the positive impact of such grandstanding in "old Europe," the Muslim world and even Russia in mind. However, Erdogan is unlikely to want to see an uncontrolled escalation in tensions, if only because it will play badly with significant parts of the Turkish military.

The successful E.U. outcome should give a bounce to the standing of the AKP government and may make an early election attractive. Accession negotiations should indeed commence on Oct. 3. The future of Iraq is altogether less predictable and will require considerable management. It is in its impact on Turkish-U.S. relations that Iraq may be most problematic.