EU Intelligence Cooperation: A Greek Approach

After the cataclysmic changes that took place in Central and Eastern Europe as well as on the Balkan Peninsula with the break up of the Yugoslavian nation, the Europeans expected that Europe would become a more peaceful and stable region, but the contrary has been the case.

In July 1991, the European Union had to deal with a major crisis in Yugoslavia. This crisis became a civil war and the Europeans were unable to stop the fighting. One of the reasons for the failure of the European Union states was the divided opinions and later actions of the individual member-states.

Furthermore, the European Union did not realize how deep-rooted the conflict between the different ethnic groups was. Through continuous analyzing of the situation, the European Union states might have been able to realize sooner that a major conflict in Yugoslavia was inevitable and been able to diffuse the conflict before it could explode.

The Maastricht Treaty seized the opportunity in 1991 to catalyze the process when it was referred to the perspective of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) including the eventual framing of a common defence policy.

On 14 November 1995, in Madrid, assessments were investigated and promises made, to contribute towards enhancing European security and intelligence arrangements with the conclusion that development of intelligence cooperation was important for operational capabilities.

In 1998, President Chirac of France categorically stated at the British-French Summit in St. Malo that new policies would inevitably create new practices. At the Summit, it was stated that intelligence was fundamental to the success of the European Union, and that it must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication. This notion was reinforced in the Cologne Declaration as well as in the Amsterdam Treaty in order to create a policy of planning and early warning unit.

However, how an intelligence service might fit in the overall European Union mechanism and what its shape and role might be, is a prospective challenge for the member-states in the European Union.

Its most important task would be the analysis of overtly gathered information and preparing it for use by the policy makers. The question of to whom the European Union Intelligence Director will report, should be a compromise among the European Commission, European Council and the European Parliament.

Furthermore, when the European Union Intelligence Service foresees a situation which could be threatening to the European Union member-states, such as the crisis in Yugoslavia or prospective religious turmoil leading to terrorist acts, the Council of Ministers should be involved as well by informing appropriately their national intelligence services.

Since the Council of Ministers is the official decision-making body of the European Union, it should receive reports and analysis from the European Union Intelligence Service. However, the problem here is that a Minister of foreign affairs might have difficulties and conflicts in dealing with the foreign affairs of his own country and that of the European Union at the same time. This is a good reason to found a Committee on European Intelligence, which will refer directly to the EU Commission. (*)

On the other side, the European Parliament would be the one to approve the budget of the European Union Intelligence Service. In the U.S., the Congress is also responsible for the approval of the budget of the United States Intelligence Community. The European Parliament could in the future also become the institution to provide oversight over the European Union Intelligence Service operations comparable to U.S. Congressional oversight over the Intelligence Community.

The Council of Ministers as well as the European Parliament could also be involved in the determination of the issues that should be monitored by the European Union Intelligence Service.

However, threats have to be clearly identified and a European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) must be corresponded to a coherent intelligence action that would be defined in a European Intelligence Act. This act would support the pillar’s role of the European Director of Intelligence in a renewal transatlantic cooperation within the framework of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

A question that has to be asked now is what kind of relationship should be established between NATO, U.S. and the European Union Intelligence Service?

In the United States, the military establishment has its own intelligence agencies. It would be safe to assume that the military institution of the European Union will have its own intelligence. One of the reasons for having its own agencies is that the military requires different intelligence information than the other departments. The European Union Intelligence Service would coordinate strategic intelligence, including that of the military.

To sum up, if European governments are willing to provide classified information to the European Union Intelligence Service, as well as the necessary manpower and resources, it could make a significant contribution to European collaboration in intelligence analysis.

Security and intelligence analysts who promote the idea of a European Union Common Intelligence Policy argue that intelligence collaboration is already taking place successfully around the world; in the European Union Satellite Center in Torrejon; the Situation Center at the United Nations in New York and the informal gathering of the Club of Berne in Switzerland.

The last, the Club of Berne, although a controversial Forum, does demonstrate that significant cooperation between European Union member-states can occur.

Furthermore, since European Union member-states address the possibilities of a future European Army, even if it remains simply a peacekeeping facility, it is crucial that an intelligence policy is created, since successful armed forces require to be well informed. Reduced duplication and closed cooperation among the member-states offers an opportunity for efficient intelligence cooperation.

However, the establishment of intelligence capabilities in the European Union should not be designed to compete with the United States. Indeed, internationalization of intelligence is very unlikely to occur while the U.S. remains a hegemonic power, since it will resist all attempts to relinquish control of national intelligence policies. Perhaps regionalism of intelligence is a viable alternative, of which a European intelligence policy would be a key pillar.

Without a comprehensive, intelligent and firm policy in the European Union, terrorism, ethnic and religious conflicts will continue to present a real threat to the European continent for the future generation.
Nevertheless, a lack of knowledge about potential conflicts on the European continent could be more costly than maintaining a viable European Union intelligence structure. The eastern and southern peripheries of Europe are regions with considerable instability.

The Balkan and Persian Gulf crises have been sufficiently traumatic to convey the message that if the European Union is serious about achieving the objective of a common foreign, security, and defence policy, the requirement for a common European Union intelligence policy is critical.

The notion of the European Director of Intelligence is an appropriate development for the future, a logical step in the evolution of the European Union.

(*) John M. Nomikos, A European Union Intelligence Service for Confronting Terrorism, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Volume 18, Issue 2 March 2005 , pages 191 - 203