by Vassilios Thierry Faïtas and Antonios Georgios Zairis
In a historic turn of events, the first Greek astronaut is expected to participate in an ISS mission in late 2027—paving the way for new strategic horizons for Greece’s participation in the European space programme.
Greece’s involvement in space initiatives is neither new nor unique, broadly pursuing the standard EU framework timeline of smaller states. A signatory to the Outer Space Treaty since 1967, the country has transformed itself over the last decade from an observer into an active participant in European space affairs.
Through the attainment of ESA membership in 2005 and its cooperation in other similar programmes, Greece managed to establish the Hellenic Space Agency in 2018. The latter was later restructured into the Hellenic Space Center, becoming Greece’s first national space agency and further deepening the country’s cooperation with other states and entities.
The National Recovery and Resilience Plan Greece 2.0, introduced in 2021, gave way to the preparation of the National Microsatellite Programme and later its implementation in 2024—coinciding with the country’s ratification of the Artemis Accords the same year. With its first microsatellite programme in space, the following year, Greece launched its first two SAR satellites into orbit and followed suit with other similar projects.
This year, utilising the experience and results of the aforementioned programme, Greece has unveiled HELLAS-SPACE 2.0, a new national space programme under the auspices of the European Space Agency with an estimated budget of €350 million. This transformative programme—with horizons up to 2030—has already entered its second phase of further expanding the country’s satellite ecosystem.
Through space diplomacy, Greece is seeking new ways to ensure its strategic autonomy by increasing its national capacity within the European ecosystem and integrating itself into European power networks.
Athens has already been expanding its space initiatives via multi-million-euro investments, supported by bodies like Enterprise Greece, in areas such as data processing, geoinformatics, and AI. For the moment, the Greek space programme includes the Hellenic space radar, assembly, integration, and testing, but its ultimate goal is to build control centres, data processing systems, security systems and attract specialist human resources.
Investment in space technology is a key factor in ensuring the retention of skilled personnel specialised in cybersecurity, AI, microelectronics and robotics, as this will attract new talent in areas previously conditioned to pursue careers in other EU countries (brain gain). Furthermore, the transition from a microsatellite programme to HELLAS-SPACE 2.0 is of strategic importance, as it will further strengthen Greece’s economic attractiveness by allowing for the sustained development of infrastructure and domestic industry.
For Greece, following European space initiatives directly affects regional dynamics across the Eastern Mediterranean.
The Eastern Mediterranean is one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors—being a rich energy hub and linking European markets with the Suez Canal and other parts of the world. Notwithstanding, it is also a place of critical importance, with interested actors such as Greece, Türkiye, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt, all competing for its control.
Athens has a maritime pendency with Ankara regarding the delimitation of their EEZs, continental shelves, as well as their airspace. However, space has a fundamentally different legal regime.
Both Greece and Türkiye are signatories to the Outer Space Treaty—establishing that outer space cannot be claimed as national territory—and the Artemis Accords—promoting cooperation and the prevention of harmful interference between signatory members—which gives them a domain in which they can cooperate without having to resolve their disputes over the Eastern Mediterranean first.
Furthermore, Greece is an established member of ESA and Türkiye is an important strategic collaborator of the latter, meaning that any space-related collaboration between the two is channeled through multilateral ESA frameworks rather than fraught bilateral avenues.
In other words, Athens can freely use its already established national microsatellite programme (GNSSP) for disaster management, wildfire response, environmental monitoring, as well as maritime awareness and national security in the context of European collaboration and Türkiye, in turn, can do the same with its TÜRKSAT satellites, while still collaborating with the latter.
This can also be applied to other regional actors in the Eastern Mediterranean, such as Cyprus, Egypt and Israel, which have already developed their own respective space initiatives. For instance, Cyprus is an ESA associate member, Israel—having one of the world’s most advanced and capable space programmes—has signed a cooperation agreement with ESA and Egypt, through its own space agency, as well as the African Space Agency (AfSA), channels cooperation with the wider European ecosystem.
Ultimately, despite the differences among the actors involved, space collaboration can help limit tensions—if not entirely avoid them. Importantly, it also strengthens Greece’s ability to maintain regional stability, while extending its diplomatic reach into neighbouring hotspots.
Sustaining such a national space programme presents significant operational challenges. The Greek space programme still suffers from some fundamental problems and risks. Firstly, following the completion of initial research, funding is often suspended by companies. Additionally, the fragmentation of projects, dependence on external providers, as well as technological decay and mission failure have a considerable impact on financial performance and undermine strategic continuity. Finally, relying on satellite-driven data means that just as critical industries depend on real-time processing, government infrastructure simultaneously becomes an attractive target for cyber-attacks.
In order to tackle this, Greece must transform itself from a mere financier into an anchor customer and capital provider. It is essential, therefore, to consider the multiplier effect across public investment, private capital, exports, research, entrepreneurship and infrastructure. This will effectively allow Greece to increase its capacity to generate and utilise critical data.
The establishment of an independent space-driven Greek think tank—connecting industry leaders, defense planners and academic researchers—is another necessary measure. This could be set up either as a sub-division of the European Space Policy Institute, or as an independent body aligned with ELIAMEP. Through such an institution, Greece can establish a concrete long-term strategy to keep space investments afloat.
Greece’s success lies in whether it can effectively translate public space funding into corporate engagement, human capital retention and exportable services. Were Greece to succeed in linking space infrastructure with defence policy, civil protection, shipping, agriculture and high-tech research, space will act as a genuine multiplier of national power and productivity. This will ultimately determine how Greece organises its economic, technological and security posture for the coming decade.
Greece should aim for selective strategic autonomy, rather than pursuing unrealistic space self-sufficiency: possessing sovereign assets of distinct operational value while actively leveraging shared European infrastructure.
For the time being, space diplomacy seems like a cost-effective approach for Greece and the wider European alliance. Nonetheless, its future is hard to predict, as space increasingly becomes a field of economic and geopolitical competition, forming two opposing camps: China-allied countries (ILRS) and US-allied ones (Artemis Accords). In this context, Europe—and to an extent Greece—should strategically prepare for such a future through a concrete strategic space plan; otherwise, they will risk exposure to strategic dependency and external vulnerability.
*Vassilios Thierry Faïtas is a Master’s student in International Strategies and Diplomacy at ISIT - Paris-Panthéon-Assas University.
*Antonis Zairis is a Prof. of Business Administration & Marketing and Member of the American Economic Association (AEA)
By: N. Peter Kramer
